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Earlier Buddhist Theories of Free Will:
Compatibilism
Riccardo Repetti1

Abstract
This is the first part of a three-article series that examines Buddhist accounts of free will. The present article introduces the issues and reviews earlier attempts by Frances Story,2 Walpola
Rāhula, Luis Gómez, and David Kalupahana.3 These “early-period”
authors advocate compatibilism between Buddhist doctrine, determinism (the doctrine of universal lawful causation), and free
will. The second article reviews later attempts by Mark Siderits,4
Gay Watson, Joseph Goldstein, and Charles Goodman. These
1

Department of History, Philosophy and Political Science, Kingsborough College, CUNY.
Email: rrepetti@kingsborough.edu .
2

The sequence in the Abstract shows the earliest iterations of these authors’ positions.
Although Story’s work was published in 1976, after some of the others’ works, the material referenced here was first presented in a talk about twenty years prior to its publication in his book.
3

Kalupahana (Buddhist). I also review the relevant discussions in Kalupahana (History;
Ethics), both of which were published during the time frame of what I am referring to as
the “middle-period,” although his “early-period” position remains relatively unchanged.
4

Siderits (Beyond) was published in the time frame of the middle-period, but I also review Siderits (Buddhism; Buddhist; and Paleo-Compatibilism), although the substance
of his main argument has not changed.
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“middle-period” authors embrace either partial or full incompatibilism. The third article reviews recent attempts by Nicholas F.
Gier and Paul Kjellberg, Asaf Federman, Peter Harvey, and B. Alan
Wallace. These “recent-period” authors divide along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines. Most of the scholarly Buddhist
works that examine free will in any depth are reviewed in this series.5 Prior to the above-mentioned early-period scholarship,
scholars of Buddhism were relatively silent on free will. The
Buddha’s teachings implicitly endorse a certain type of free will
and explicitly endorse something very close to determinism, but
attempts to articulate the implicit theory bear significant interpretive risks. The purpose of this three-article series is to review
such attempts in order to facilitate a comprehensive view of the
present state of the discussion and its history.

Did the Buddha Teach Free Will?
Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one
whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who
explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn
out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred.6

5

Some others include T.P. Kasulis (Zen), Edward Conze (Buddhist), and Galen Strawson
(Bounds). Kasulis and Conze only make certain remarks en passant that bear on the issue; they don’t directly analyze free will. Strawson only draws upon Buddhist ideas,
such as the idea of the non-acceptance of a permanent self, in support of his rejection
of free will. Although I reveal my hand throughout this three-article series, I have an
account of “a” Buddhist theory of free will of my own (Meditation) and a more general
version of the same account that engages deeply with the Western analytic philosophical discussion of free will (Counterfactual).
6

“Neyyatha Sutta: A Meaning to be Inferred,” from the Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN) 2.25, Thanissaro Bhikkhu translation. Abbreviated references to Buddhist texts are based on Pāli
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The title of Federman’s article raises the question, “What Kind of Free
Will Did the Buddha Teach?” This question suggests that the Buddha
taught a certain kind of “free will.” Federman’s article attempts to substantiate that suggestion. The Tathāgata (the Buddha) never discussed
“free will,” but he did discuss fate, chance, karma, “dependent origination” or “conditioned arising” (the thesis that all conditioned phenomena originate or arise in dependence upon previous conditions),7 the
efficacy of volition, effort, choice, and action, and a host of things that
presuppose a kind of free will. But as the sūtra quoted above suggests, explicit and implicit accounts of the Buddha’s thought are very different
things.
Contemporary Western philosophical positions on free will are
almost entirely defined by their stance on the question of whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible with free will,8 which poses
the following dilemma. If determinism is true, our choices are inevitable,
Text Society abbreviations of the Pāli Canon. All such referenced material is accessible
online at Access to Insight (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index.html). A “Sutta” (Pāli;
“sūtra”: Sanskrit) is a discourse of the Buddha. (While such translations and/or explanations of basic terms are obvious to scholars of Buddhism, these sorts of explanations
are intended for Western philosophers and others who might also be interested in the
Buddhist view of free will.)
7

In the text I qualify “phenomena” with “conditioned” because Buddhism accepts an
unconditioned, nirvāṇa, and it is unclear whether nirvāṇa, which is typically characterized only in negative terms (i.e., as the absence of various undesirable factors), is
properly described as a phenomenon. Also, the doctrine of dependent origination allows
that the condition for something might be simultaneous with it. For instance, nāmarūpa (“name and form”) is characterized as both simultaneous with the six senses and
as a key condition for those senses. However, it is not clear that this sort of dependency
is causal, rather than mereological dependency or some sort of subvenient/supervenient
dependence, in which case the linearity of causation is not obviously threatened by this
sort of simultaneous dependence.
8

Strawson’s is an exception. He argues that free will is impossible for other reasons,
reasons the Buddhist would reject: because choice is always influenced by one’s mental
states and these are always influenced in turn by prior mental states, and unless an
agent could create itself it could not escape such influences, but no one is a causa sui
(self-causing being). See Repetti (Meditation; Counterfactual), for a Buddhist refutation
of this argument.
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lawful effects of causes that predate our existence, so our belief that we
have free will—that we could have done otherwise—is illusory. But if determinism is false (indeterminism), then our choices are random, no different from coin tosses, so we cannot credibly claim they are “up to us.”
Thus, either way, there is no free will.
Dependent origination seems to be the same as determinism, under a slightly different description. But different descriptions that pick
out identical phenomena cannot be substituted within belief contexts.
For instance, “Clark” and “Superman” are different descriptions of the
same (fictional) entity. Lois Lane may have seen Superman at the scene,
but it would be an error to conclude that she believed Clark Kent was there.
Likewise, dependent origination and determinism might describe the
same principles, and it is not certain that they do, but even if they do,
they involve different descriptions. Thus, it would be risky to conclude
that the Buddha was a determinist.9

9

There is an interpretive issue about the claim that the Buddha was omniscient which
threatens to undermine the point being made in the text. One understanding of omniscience implies that the Buddha’s epistemic states were marked by perfect apprehension
of reality, and relative to this notion (of perfectly unobstructed apprehension of reality) because “belief” connotes some sort of epistemic opacity, it seems erroneous to
attribute “beliefs” to the Buddha, as opposed to knowledge. But the point being made in
the present case (by analogy with Lois Lane’s beliefs) turns precisely on the issue of
how the descriptive content of a thought individuates that thought from other thoughts about the same object that are defined by different descriptive contents. Here is the
problem: If omniscience implies that the Buddha knows the different descriptive contents of every thought and also all the cases where those different thought-descriptions
denote identical objects, then my claim in the text—that the Buddha cannot necessarily
be considered a determinist even if determinism and dependent origination differently
describe the same phenomena—would be false. For if dependent origination and determinism are coextensive in their denotation, then the Buddha would know that, and
he would be a determinist. I am uncertain about the exact type of omniscience the
Buddha was supposed to possess, but it is not identical to that of the Western form attributed to an ideal God, so I am hesitant to make this sort of argument. One description of the Buddha’s omniscience that supports the idea that it is distinct from God’s
omniscience is that it is not the case that the Buddha knows everything, but that he
apprehends clearly anything he focuses his attention on. If he never focused his attention on the descriptions that constitute the doctrine of determinism, then the claim in
the text holds. But even if the counterargument against my claim in the text is correct,
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The Buddha explicitly discussed dependent origination, not as a
threat to volitional freedom, but rather as an aid: to teach that volitional
(and other) conditions that lead to mental bondage could be reversed,
that they could lead to mental freedom. Those mental-bondage-fostering
conditions involve the unreflective, unrestricted expression of volitional
impulses, which is what many Westerners typically associate with free
will: the ability to choose freely, to do whatever we want to do, to do as
we please. The Buddha did not prize unregulated volitional expression,
however. The Buddha valued the more general ability to regulate volitions, to choose which ones to express or restrain in order to attain liberation. He more likely would consider this broader ability to be what is
meant by “free will.” And he would likely consider unrestricted volitional expression as a mental-bondage-fostering indulgence, propelled mainly by unreflective dispositions and thus better described as “unfree will.”
In any case, the Buddhist notions of (autonomy-resembling) regulated volition and (determinism-resembling) dependent origination
are certainly compatible, because the former requires the latter, so the
“problem” of their compatibility never arose within Buddhism. The
Buddha did not explicitly discuss “determinism” or “free will,” nor did
he value the conception that Westerners take to constitute free will, so
the problem of the compatibility of determinism and free will never
arose either. The Buddha advocated other volitional-regulation-related
abilities, such as the ability to control attention, to be mindful, to cultivate dharmic10 (liberation-oriented) views, intentions, and habits, and to
we are not omniscient, and we lack knowledge of this equivalence between determinism and dependent origination, in which case a version of the argument applies nevertheless to what “Buddhists” believe.
10

From “Dharma,” a complex, originally Vedic philosophical term whose meaning the
Buddha revised. In the Vedas, the varna (caste) system posits that one’s karmic evolution determines one’s birth and thus one’s station in life, and one’s dharma (duty) as
such. In the Bhagavad Gita, for example, the god Krishna tells the kṣatriya (warrior caste)
Arjuna that it is his dharma to engage wholeheartedly in the massive battle before him,
despite Arjuna’s compassionate stirrings for his potentially killed relatives, friends, and
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reverse adharmic ones. The Buddha discussed mental freedom and
placed it at the heart of his teaching, along with understanding of dependent origination as the key to its attainment (Kalupahana Buddhist
30). Because Buddhism is mainly concerned with dependent origination
and mental freedom, and these concepts resemble determinism and free
will, respectively, Buddhism has a wealth of implicit thought on free will,
and an even greater wealth of explicit thought on these closely related
ideas.
The central Buddhist belief that we can rearrange conditions in a
way that leads to mental freedom presupposes a volition-regulating type
of free will, whereas unregulated volitional expression is a hindrance to
liberation, not something intrinsically valuable. The Western philosophical tradition typically wishes to expand volition-expressing autonomous
agency and defend it against the threat of determinism, but for Buddhists, ego-based volitional impulse must be tamed with the assistance of
(determinism-resembling) principles of dependent origination. Thus, in
Buddhism, (determinism-resembling) dependent origination is not a
problem but an ally, and this in turn means that “free will” is not a philosophical problem, but a practical one: how to regulate volitional impulses
in order to achieve liberation. This is mainly why there is no “free will
problem” within Buddhism and thus no discussion of it throughout
Buddhist history prior to challenges from Western philosophy and
science.
Thus, although the Buddha believed in free-will-resembling,
mental-freedom-oriented volitional regulation and determinismresembling dependent origination, whether he would have seen “free
countrymen. The Buddha uses this term, capitalized, to refer to what may be characterized as the way things are (from the enlightened perspective), the pattern of things, or
the law of all phenomena. It is sometimes used somewhat loosely to refer to the Buddha’s teachings, thought to be coextensive with the ultimate truth. This shift in meaning
is didactic: the Varna system is not how things really are, not the ultimate truth.
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will” and “determinism” as compatible is unclear. If, moreover, as Michael Barnhart claims,11 a “blissful maintenance of contradiction” is often embraced within Asian philosophy, it follows that we cannot assume
that anyone maintaining two beliefs has a belief about their compatibility, much less an account of it. Let us name the assumption that the mere
maintenance of two beliefs in one mind or doctrine entails a belief in
their compatibility “Barnhart’s fallacy,” and reasoning that avoids it
“Barnhart’s virtue.” Any account that attributes “compatibilism” (between free will and determinism) to the Buddha risks Barnhart’s fallacy,
and any account that attributes a view of “free will” to the Buddha also
risks flouting the sūtra above.12
In Western philosophy there are so many conceptions of causality, autonomy, and their relationships as to make “the” free will problem
a misnomer. Thus, attempts to resolve “the” free will problem appear
sophomoric. There are good reasons to think Buddhism contains a plurality of views (Keown, Buddhism)—equally complex, if not more so.
Maybe there is, as the title of Goldstein’s monograph suggests, One Dharma, but the differences in world view that divide Theravāda and
Mahāyāna Buddhists alone are radical.13 Because both Buddhist and
Western philosophical conceptions of free will are so complex, attempts
to integrate them will generate difficulties greater than attempts to understand either. Thus, we must be cautious in our assertions about “what
the Buddha taught.”

11

Barnhart (recent conversation).

12

AN 2.25.

13

Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes the earliest Pāli texts that contain original discourses of the Buddha, the Buddha’s monastic rules, and philosophical explications of
the doctrines implicit in both; these texts form what has come to be known as the Pāli
Canon. Mahāyāna Buddhism includes variant versions of these, but places greater emphasis on subsequent texts, mostly in Sanskrit, that emerge later on in India beginning
with the teachings of Nāgārjuna, an influential early Mahāyāna teacher considered by
many Mahāyānists to be the “second Buddha” (Loy, Second).
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I mentioned above that the early-period authors embrace a compatibilism between Buddhism, determinism, and free will. This does not
mean that they commit Barnhart’s fallacy thereby. Rather, they do not
think Buddhism is threatened by the Western philosophical problem. It
is natural that the first Buddhist scholars to consider whether Buddhism
is threatened by this Western philosophical dilemma would be inclined
to defend Buddhism by embracing compatibilism, because compatibilism
may be described, in simplified terms, as the view that there is no problem with free will and determinism or indeterminism. Perhaps the
greater reflection on the issue afforded by time and aided by the assertions of the early-period scholars partly explains why middle-period
scholars begin to move in the other direction, toward incompatibilism.
The same factors likely explain why recent-period scholars divide
along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, a division that parallels the
one between Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism. The relevant difference between them for purposes of this discussion is that because
Theravāda Buddhism accepts a more linear version of dependent origination that more closely resembles determinism, Theravādins are likely to
argue for compatibilism. Because Mahāyāna Buddhism embraces a more
radical, non-linear, or holistic version of that doctrine, sometimes described distinctly as interdependent origination, that might be compatible
with indeterminism,14 Mahāyānists are more likely to argue for incompatibilism between free will and determinism than Theravādins. Conceivably, for each doctrinally distinct kind of Buddhism, there may well be a
distinct theory of free will.
14

Arguably, the version of the doctrine of dependent origination that emphasizes interdependence may make things harder to predict, but it is all still conditionality at
work. Indeed, it might count as a greater form of determinism, whereby every particle
in the universe simultaneously causes and is caused by every other particle, and each
such interconnection between any two particles is still linear in that particle A affects
particle B while B affects A, each in a deterministic fashion. Adding them all together
only magnifies the determinism.
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As this relatively short synopsis of the issues reveals, there is no
singular Buddhist theory of free will, just as there is no singular Western
philosophical theory of free will. Each Buddhist account seems to capture some essential insight about free will but seems to remain inconclusive or unconvincing in whole. Unsurprisingly, the same holds for the
Western accounts of the subject. The purpose of this three-article series
is to highlight both what is intuitive and what is problematic in these
Buddhist accounts, to help raise the level of the discussion and connect it
more informatively with the Western discussion and its powerful challenges, and to facilitate more comprehensive Buddhist responses to
these challenges.
Let us turn now to what the early-period scholars had to say, beginning with the earliest, Frances Story, who first addressed the problem
in the 1950s.
Story: “Non-rigid” or “Soft” Determinism?
Story (385) elucidates the key difference between karma and determinism by noting that whereas causation is universal, karma is restricted to
volitional action and its consequences: “Volition, intention, O Bhikkhus, is
what I call Kamma”.15 Story analyzes the relationship between present
volitional action, karmic processes and formations from the past (dispositions), future results (382-383), other categories of karmic and nonkarmic causation, and how action may involve predispositions and other
effects of previous karma. But he insists that because there is always an
element of volition or voluntariness in any present action, despite the powerful karmic dispositional loading, so to speak, the karma doctrine is
not fatalistic (389).
15

AN 4.63. “Bhikkhus” are Buddhist monks; “Kamma” (Pāli) is karma (Sanskrit), volitional action, its dispositional force, its effects, and/or the lawful principles of cause
and effect that govern that force, seen to be like “seeds” that set up a chain of conditions that mature into later pleasant or unpleasant ‘fruits’ for the agent of the action.
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Apart from his rich analysis of the different ways an action can
variably bear fruit, Story makes interesting remarks about action requiring
intention. Rejecting the karma doctrine of the Bhagavad Gītā (that prescribes action without expectation of result), Story says “there must, in
any case, be desire for the accomplishment of the act, or the act itself
could never be carried out” (388). This is a Humean axiom: reason without motive cannot move a person into action. However, Story adds: “This
applies to every action except those performed by the Arahant; since
there is no ‘unchanging Atman’, no distinction can be made between the
doer and the deed” (388). Story’s “Arahant” (Pāli; Sanskrit: arhat) is an
enlightened being; his “Atman” (ātman) is the Indian philosophical conception of an independent self or soul that Buddhism rejects in favor of a
“no-self” doctrine that denies any integrated, enduring, substantive metaphysical underpinning to the aggregates of psychophysical phenomena that give rise to the impression of selfhood.
Story is astute to immediately connect the issue of no-self with
free will, for it is unclear how a non-agent can perform any action, freely
or otherwise.16 But the idea of non-intentional enlightened action seems to
contradict the idea of the necessity of intention for action. Story’s suggestion is that because the enlightened being is not an agent separate
from the universe, the universe intends the action, as Wallace suggests
(67-68); but the notion of cosmic teleology is difficult to square with
scientific understanding. Story asserts these contradictory claims, but
does not try to reconcile them. Arguably, however, they may be reconciled. Assuming that even non-dualistic action requires an initiating intention, it follows that the actions of enlightened beings count as
intentional. Because there is no separate ego in the case of enlightened
beings, there is no ego-volition, but there is volition, for example, the
volition to spread the Dharma. This line of reasoning is initially promis16

The notion that a permanent, unchanging ātman can even act at all is equally rejected
in Buddhism.
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ing, but it still raises the question: Whose volition is it, if there is no
agent? According to the Buddha’s doctrine of anātman (no-self), insubstantiality or emptiness characterize not only the person, but everything,
in which case volitions simply arise impersonally (based on the web of
conditions in play). This is so whether a person is caught in the illusion
of ego or not. Thus, the same question (about whose volition it is) applies
to the enlightened and the unenlightened equally. And the answer is the
same in both cases: the volition belongs, ultimately, to nobody, even
though we may distinguish volitions by reference to the “persons” who
express them, for pragmatic reasons. The only difference is that the arhat knows this, but the “worldling” (puthujjana)17 does not, and takes the
pragmatic reference to be substantive. Arhats may be said to have desires, primarily for the welfare of all beings, but they have no egovolitions, cravings, and the like.
Story does examine the facially problematic issue of how a nonself can bear karma and whether or not the non-self who acts is the same
non-self who experiences the karmic fruit. His answer is neither distinctly affirmative nor negative. He says that there is a karmic line running continuously through the series (392): although the individual is
the result of all his previous karma, he is free in the present to perform
actions that change his future. As he changes, he becomes, in a manner
of speaking, someone else although there is continuity with the former
self out of which he emerges. (“Self” here functions simply as a convenient pronoun.)18
17

The worldling is not only the non-Buddhist (human or otherwise), but even most
Buddhists, by virtue of the fact that they have not yet attained the first level of liberating insight that precipitates becoming a “stream entrant,” that is, one who has entered
the stream that leads to full awakening thereafter within a maximum of seven lifetimes.
18

Presumably, Story is here trying to express in his own words the classic Theravāda
view that over time, from life to life, a being is ‘neither (unchangingly) the same, nor
(completely) different’ (Milindapañha 40). In other words, nothing of the person remains
completely unchanged between any two moments, ultimately, and yet the continuity
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Story says “We are free to select the causes which shall determine our action in the moment of choice” (392), illustrating the principle
of dependent origination. But he adds that this “distinction is most important: it represents the whole difference between absolute determinism and free-will” (394). This reasoning, however, implies a non-absolute
determinism, a thorn in Story’s account and for those who endorse a
version of it—Gómez, Kaluphana, Gier and Kjellberg, Federman, and Harvey. Because these writers embrace dependent origination and reject
absolute determinism, perhaps this is grounds for rejecting the idea that
dependent origination and determinism really are the same idea under
different descriptions. The problem with this idea is that because determinism is an absolute doctrine, any such qualification collapses into the
claim that determinism is false, and thus that indeterminism is true.19
But most of those same writers reject indeterminism, as we shall see.
One way to resolve this is to retain the rigidity of determinism
but identify sub-categories like karmic, psychological, or economic determinism that are relatively non-rigid in that they involve many more vabetween any two moments in what Siderits calls the “person-series” (Beyond Compatibilism, passim) is significant enough so that it would be a mistake to think of the
changes that occur between any two stages as sufficient grounds to conclude that the
entities present in any two such moments are entirely distinct, say, the way George
Washington and King Milinda are entirely distinct.
19

From the perspective of most Western philosophers writing on the subject, determinism is the doctrine of universal nomological (lawful) causation, and therefore by definition an absolute doctrine in that it is held to apply to all phenomena without restriction
or exception. One could conceivably, however, accept a non-universalized version of the
doctrine, say, such that some or most but not all phenomena are lawfully determined.
The main reason deterministic philosophers do not embrace this possibility is that it is
precisely what indeterminists typically claim: that even though the laws of nature apply to most (physical) phenomena, they do not apply to certain (intentional, psychological) phenomena, such as deliberation, choice, and action, the latter exceptions of
which are alleged to be indeterministic. This dichotomy may be false, but there is a
straightforward sense in which the philosophically worrisome implications of a universalized determinism vanish if one accepts a non-universalized version of the doctrine.
For, on a non-universalized version of determinism, it would no longer follow logically
that every future state of the universe, including every choice I will make, is fixed in
advance.
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riables than, say, chemical determinism, such that not all the variables
that determine behavior within that domain admit of descriptions
couched in vocabularies that operate within that domain. For instance,
psychological determinism may involve laws that govern causal relations between mental states, described in “folk” psychological vocabulary (such as “belief” and “desire”), such as the “practical syllogism”
generalization: for all persons, desires, and beliefs, if person A desires y
and believes that x leads to y, then, ceteris paribus (other things being
equal), A will do x.
But psychological determinism presumably allows that neurological and other “lower-level” laws also apply to and influence action, that
not all the factors required for a full explanation of why person A desires
y are couched in folk psychological terms, and that some of these involve
lower-level (for example, neural) phenomena described by lower-level
vocabularies and laws. In that regard, psychological determinism isn’t rigid or absolute, nor is neurological determinism, but determinism simpliciter is rigid and absolute, because it contains and ranges over all those
sub-level laws and all their interactions. When an unqualified determinist thinks the laws in a sub-domain such as economics are non-rigid, she
means that unknown factors not in the vocabulary of economics are in
play. But this non-rigidity is sub-domain-relative and/or merely epistemic, in the same way that the weather is non-rigidly determined by laws
couched in the vocabulary of meteorology, but ultimately rigidly determined nonetheless.
Thus, the better alternative is to use the more viable pair of contrasting qualifications to determinism, namely, hard and soft, as these
have been articulated within the Western analytic philosophical discussion. Both involve determinism simpliciter, but “hard” just means “rules
out free will” and “soft” just means “doesn’t rule out free will.” While
there are other important ways of distinguishing them, we may capture
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a core difference in meaning by attributing inevitability to hard determinism and evitability to soft determinism.20 Let me explain what is
meant by “evitability.” Although all determinists think that all events
are determined and that whatever is determined will happen necessarily, for a hard determinist this implies that all events are determined in
such a way that nothing we can do can make any difference whatsoever
to final outcomes; for a soft determinist there is a possibility that an outcome may be changed by someone who is sufficiently aware of causes
and conditions, even though the ultimate outcome is nonetheless determined. Soft determinists argue that awareness of how this action leads
to that undesirable outcome engenders causal knowledge that renders that
undesirable outcome evitable, for that outcome may be avoided by avoiding this action; this form of evitability is perfectly consistent with determinism, for it is the knowledge itself that causally contributes to the
avoidance of the undesirable outcome, even if that knowledge itself was
deterministically caused. The obvious connection with Buddhism is that
the Buddha taught the evitability of mental bondage and therefore
might be labeled a soft determinist.21
The only problem with the hard/soft distinction is that both are
exceptionless. However, Story and his followers seem to think that although determinism mostly governs the universe, little pockets of free
will (and, implicitly, of indeterminism) somehow obtain. But because if
even a single subatomic particle is not determined, its indeterminacy
could influence everything else, exceptions to determinism entail indeterminism. So, unless they have an account that refutes this latter claim,
Buddhists would be wise to replace “non-absolute” with “soft.”
20

Dennett’s Elbow Room constitutes an elaborate, highly syncretic argument in support
of the compatibility of evitability and determinism.
21

Harvey and Federman rest their main compatibilist conclusion on the notion that this
(Dennett’s) point about evitability applies to Buddhism in precisely the way just mentioned in the text: that the Buddha taught the evitability of suffering.
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Story thinks that absolute or “rigid” determinism undermines
free will; because he is certain that we have free will, determinism must
not be absolute. For Story, this involves realizing that the dependent
origination that accounts for suffering is the same dependent origination
that—when the process is reversed—leads to the eradication of suffering:
“That is the whole point of Paṭicca-samuppāda, the formula of conditioned arising—that it can be reversed, by repeated acts of decision. Man
can swim against the current: if he could not, his evolution would be impossible.” (Story 394) The main problem with these otherwise plausible
assertions is that they remain unanalyzed: they leave unresolved their
possible implications, such as indeterminism. To Western philosophers,
they smack of “libertarianism,” the view that free will and determinism
are incompatible, but we do have free will, in which case determinism
must be false (or, equivalently, indeterminism must be true).
One could maintain that dependent origination is compatible
with the future-determining dharmic choices Story thinks express our
freedom, yielding soft determinism, but his non-absolute determinism
invites indeterminism. The ability to “swim against the current” suggests contracausality, the ability to act contrary to all the causal determinants feeding into one’s behavioral system, but this also implies the
libertarian’s indeterminism.
Story could have simply bit the deterministic bullet and claimed
that the voluntary element attendant even upon karmic dispositions
that powerfully sway the moment of choice are themselves determined,
but that would require embracing one side of the Western philosophical
dilemma described at the outset: that of accounting for how domino-like
effects from lawful causes that predate our existence can be considered
free. Other Buddhist writers endorse partial determinism, so perhaps the
Barnhart’s-virtue-exhibiting conclusion, at this point, is that Buddhism
has mixed feelings, unanalyzed ideas, or even inconsistent ideas about
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determinism and freedom. As we proceed with our analysis of the other
early-period scholars, this impression will strengthen.
Rāhula: A Qualified Compatibilism
After explicating dependent origination and acknowledging the importance of free will in Western philosophy, Walpola Rāhula claims that the
free will question “does not and cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy”
(54). This claim only seems plausible, however, because he presupposes
an inflated view of free will that entails freedom from any and all conditions:
There can be nothing absolutely free, physical or mental, as everything is interdependent and relative. If Free Will implies a will
independent of conditions, independent of cause and effect, such
a thing does not exist. How can a will, or anything for that matter, arise without conditions, when the whole existence is conditioned and relative, and is within the law of cause and effect? (54)
But one could claim that the problem is with this inflated version of the
concept of free will as contracausal or acausal, where a deflated view of
the will as involving causation works just fine. For anyone advocating
this sort of deflationary view, Rāhula’s argument above commits a straw
man fallacy.
After inflating the notion of free will, Rāhula then critiques that
exaggerated notion on the basis of dependent origination. Not only is
this a straw man fallacy relative to deflationary accounts, but Rāhula
himself in the next breath advances a deflationary view of free will. But
even the attack on this straw man ignores cases in the Buddhist literature that seem to involve contracausality, perhaps the most famous being the bowl that floated upstream against the currents—just one among
many contra-natural, supernatural, or otherwise physical-law-violating,
paranormal or psychic phenomena that litter Buddhist doxography (Ka-
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lupahana Buddhist 21-23, 40-44, 114-115).22 It is also unprincipled for
those who think of nirvāṇa (enlightenment, ultimate reality) as unconditioned to dismiss out of hand the notion of free will solely on the grounds
that it entails the idea of unconditioned freedom. This line of reasoning
would suggest that we reject Story’s enlightened beings’ actions on the
ground that they seem to flow from the unconditioned. However, if the
Buddha acts from within a mental state characterized as nirvāṇa, and his
actions ensue from his will, then because nirvāṇa is unconditioned and
his will expresses it, his will seem to be free, logically speaking.
As suggested above, Rāhula subsequently admits the possibility of
a conditioned, relative free will: “Will, like any other thought, is conditioned. So-called ‘freedom’ itself is conditioned and relative. Such a conditioned ‘Free Will’ is not denied.” (54) This deflated approach to the
question creates an opening for a Buddhist compatibilism according to
which a naturally-construed form of agency is compatible with dependent origination. Rāhula does not develop the deflationary idea, but continues with his rejection of the inflated idea:
Here, again, the idea of Free Will is basically connected with the
ideas of God, Soul, justice, reward and punishment. Not only is so-called

22

Arguably, however, one could claim that if one accepts psychic phenomena and the
like, that does not mean that such phenomena are not seen as arising from (deterministic) conditions, but just that they are not entirely physical conditions. That is, if there
are other dimensions of reality, such as the sort of (astral) worlds allegedly inhabited
by devas, demons, and the like, one could conceivably hold that they are equally subject to dependent origination. Indeed, the Buddha seems to have suggested as much
when he said that beings in heaven and hell realms are so deeply (karmically) engrossed in their pleasures and their pains, respectively, that they are unlikely to be
receptive to the Dharma, and for this reason human birth is precious. But Buddhist and
Western causality diverge here, for whereas this picture seems coherent from the
Buddhist perspective, from the Western perspective the very notion of a non-physical
realm violates a foundational assumption of determinism, namely, the closure of the
physical domain: deterministic laws cannot work, cannot govern all physical phenomena, if there are non-physical causal elements that mysteriously inject novel causes into
the otherwise deterministic physical causal stream.
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free will not free, but even the very idea of Free Will is not free from
conditions. (54-55)
Rāhula is intuitively right about the inflated idea of free will. A
good question for Rāhula’s analysis, however, is whether the following
parallel claims are equally valid: “Not only is so-called nirvāṇa not free,
but even the very idea of nirvāṇa is not free from conditions. Not only is
the so-called unconditioned not free, but even the very idea of the unconditioned is not free from conditions.”
Principles of fair reasoning suggest that opposing views be afforded the same dialectical apparatus as one’s own, provided there is
nothing in the opposing views that rules out parity of reasoning. Rāhula
does not say much more on the subject. Thus, let us turn to Gómez’s account.
Gómez: Further Attempts at a Middle-path Position
Luis O. Gómez opens his article with signs of Barnhart’s virtue, for he explicitly restricts his treatment of the problem to the Nikāyas (Pāli language early record of the discourses of the Buddha), 23 while
acknowledging that Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra theories have important
implications for the issue (81).24 More to the point of Barnhart’s virtue,
Gómez states:
The reader should also be forewarned of the unavoidable risk of
discovering in Buddhist scriptures nonexisting theories and
problems, which are often nothing but the distortions caused by
our Western microscope. I would, therefore, like to underline the
23
24

These are the canonical texts of Theravāda Buddhism.

Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra are different forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Yogācārins
(followers of Yogācāra) affirm an idealist (mind-only) metaphysics, but mādhyamikas
(followers of Madhyamaka, the middle path) neither affirm nor deny either wholly
realist or wholly idealist metaphysics.
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fact that we are here also concerned with speculative arguments
that could be developed from basic Buddhist statements by implication, whether they were or were not formulated explicitly. (81;
emphasis in original)
Gómez begins his analysis with the dispute between followers of two
competing ancient Indian doctrines (vāda) about the efficacy and inefficacy of kriyā (action) or karma (action, and/or the effects of action)—
kriyāvāda (or karmavāda) and akriyāvāda (or akarmavāda), respectively.
Akriyāvādins thought all human effort was futile; I call this view “volitional fatalism.” Gómez differentiates two types of kriyāvādins, one fatalist, one not. Both thought that karma from previous actions extending
backward through indefinitely many previous lives influences current
states of being and thus current actions. One interpretation of current
action is that it is an inevitable effect of karma that lacks (what I would
describe as) any initiating causal force of its own. Let us call this view
“karmic fatalism” and its denial “karmic non-fatalism.”
Karmic non-fatalists thought, in positive terms, that effort would
help lead to liberation, whereas karmic fatalists thought, in negative
terms, that austerities (often painful, to “burn” away the results of prior
karma) and abstention from action would eventually end karma and lead to
liberation. The Buddha pointed out that even this idea implies karmic
non-fatalism, for we are able to either perform or not perform them, and
their performance makes all the difference to whether we suffer during
their performance (Gómez 84). The Buddhists were among many thenprevalent kriyāvādins, Gómez argues, but were of the karmic non-fatalist
variety. Karmic fatalism resembles hard determinism, for it suggests that
current actions are inevitable effects of previous karma. Gómez thinks,
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therefore, that the arguments in the Nikāyas against karmic fatalism
would also apply to “strict determinism,”25 and he locates at least three.
The first argument Gómez identifies (82-83) is that not all negative experiences are caused by previous karma. For example, karma does
not cause suffering due to bile, weather, accidents, and the like. 26 This is
consistent with Story, for whom karma is restricted to volitional action.
In other words, Gómez and Story seem to be in agreement on the idea
that the Buddha’s teachings on karma do not entail that even all the
non-volitional causes of one’s experiences, such as being killed in an avalanche, are themselves the karmic results of one’s previous volitions, but
rather the karmic consequences that accrue to one in the future are restricted to one’s volitional behavior in the present. Gómez’s examples
dispel the idea (sometimes erroneously associated with karmavāda) that
every experience is totally caused by previous karma.
The second argument is that the relationship between actions
and their consequences is not a one-to-one relationship such as might
obtain in simple mechanical causation, say, between the striking of a
match and fire. As an illustration, Gómez refers to the famous comparison between the effects of a grain of salt dropped in the Ganges versus
one dropped in a small cup, on the one hand, with the uncharacteristically unethical action of an otherwise saintly person and the same action
performed by an ordinary person, on the other hand (83). The Buddha
says that if there were a one-to-one karmic relationship, the saintly life
and liberation would be impossible.27 With karma the conditions are so
much more complex than they are with the match/fire relationship
(which is actually more complex than it seems: when the head side of a
dry match is struck with sufficient but not excessive force against a certain
25

His reasoning here suggests that he would substitute “hard” for “strict.”

26

Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN), 36.21.

27

Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN) 3.99.
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type of sufficiently-flint-covered surface within a relatively-oxygen-rich
atmosphere, fire results, but not if there are excessive winds or other
defeating conditions). Both the salt and match examples are consistent
with “strict determinism,” however, so Gómez could have avoided confusion if he distinguished non-strict and strict karma without arguing for
a non-strict determinism.
The third argument involves the efficacy of effort. As suggested
earlier, Gómez argues that the Buddha refuted karmic fatalism with the
simple observation that the ascetic feels pain upon performing austerities and no pain upon their non-performance, in which case the performance or non-performance is what causes the pain or its absence (84).28
Likewise, he could have argued, abstention is something one can do to alter karma, and involves effort (against desire). As Gómez suggests, the
Buddha taught that it is precisely because actions are also initiating causes
that we can attain liberation by performing the right actions, again illustrating the key principle of dependent origination.
The problem with Gómez’s argument is that (like Story) he extends the non-strict argument from karma, which is restricted to the volitional, to all dependent origination and causality, where the argument
does not make sense. He does this because he thinks that the strictness
of dependent origination contradicts the flexibility of karma. 29 To avoid
this, he tries to work out some sort of “middle way” approach through
this dilemma (88), and appeals to the no-self doctrine, the threats of

28

He may not have realized it, but this case also refutes volitional fatalism, for the ascetic must want to perform the austerity (albeit because he wants to attain liberation)
in order to perform the austerity, in which case his volition to perform the austerity is
what accounts for his performing and experiencing the austerity.
29

He is not alone here. In his translator’s commentary to the Sivaka Sutta (SN 36.21),
Thanissaro Bhikkhu, for instance, thinks the Buddha rejects determinism, stating “the
Buddha’s teaching on kamma avoids determinism and opens the way for a path of
practice focused on eliminating the causes of suffering in the here and now.”
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eternalism and nihilism that attach respectively to asserting or denying
the reality of anything, and the two-truths doctrine, which differentiates
between the view of reality from the enlightened versus the everyday
vantages (85-87). All of these complex efforts are, on analysis, misplaced;
they are unnecessary and are less clear than his treatment of karmic fatalism. When the premises one offers in support of one’s conclusion are
weaker or less plausible than the conclusion, then that amounts to a
form of question-begging.
All Gómez needed to do—like Story—was to acknowledge that
karmic variability is consistent with invariable dependent origination.
But his reasoning, particularly in the concluding section of his essay,
suggests that for him—like so many others, Buddhists and non-Buddhists
alike—determinism entails fatalism. His closing sentence illustrates this:
The question is then, does the Buddhist middle way solve the
problem, and the answer again is obvious, if by causation is
meant “weak” conditioning, then perhaps it does solve it, but if
total conditioning of the series is intended, then the Buddhist
would be no better than the Ājīvika (Gómez 88).
(The Ājīvikas were akriyāvādin fatalist followers of Makkhali Gosāla.)
I submit that if Story, Rāhula, and Gómez understood the differences between hard and soft determinism, they would agree that the
Buddha would reject hard determinism and would likely accept soft determinism. Because the same overall perspective is endorsed by Kalupahana, the same problems arise, as we shall see.
Kalupahana: Further Complications with Qualified Compatibilism
David Kalupahana does not directly analyze free will or say much else directly on the subject. Kalupahana states that although there “is no one
single term in the Buddhist texts that could be considered the equivalent
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of the term will,” there are a variety of related terms such as volition, intention, purpose, desire, craving, thirst, and want (Ethics 49). In Western philosophy, however, these same notions fare equally alongside will as part
of the phenomena to be explained. After detailing those other factors,
Kalupahana argues that volition “is the most important factor in determining whether a person is responsible or not for an action” (52). Most
Western philosophers would agree that whatever feature of voluntary
behavior determines responsibility is a free-will-relevant feature, and
that volition is such a key feature for determining responsibility. Although Kalupahana does not draw the inference, it would be logical,
therefore, to equate volition with the “will” of “free will.”
Kalupahana examines several causes of volitional actions, such as
instincts, conscious motivations (such as feelings of attachment and desire), and unconscious motivations (such as the desire to live), but concludes that Buddhist moral responsibility applies only to conscious
motivations (Buddhist 46-47). This conclusion puts Kalupahana close to
compatibilist Western philosophers (like Hume, Locke, Frankfurt, and
Dennett) who see morally responsible agency as compatible with causation so long as the right relationship obtains between the agent, her volitions or reasons for acting, and her actions.
With volition as key to karmic and moral responsibility, all that is
left for Buddhist compatibilism is an account of how dependent origination and volition mesh, such as Story’s account. Kalupahana begins to
construct such an account, stating that the Buddha’s conception of causation involved four features:
(1) It is objectively real (tathatā);
(2) It involves necessity (avitathatā);
(3) It involves invariability (anaññathatā); and
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(4) It is conditional (ida-ppaccayatā) (Buddhist 27-28; SN.12.20).
Because causation is conditional, as in feature (4), knowledge of those
conditional causes that lead to the desired conditional effects makes it
possible to bring about the conditions that necessarily, as in feature (2),
and invariably, as in feature (3), bring about freedom from the ordinary
operations of causation that so far have led to mental bondage and suffering (31-33). If he’s right about these four features, Buddhism might
accept soft determinism. But Story (Dimensions) and Gómez (Aspects) resist the second and third of these four features, as discussed above, and
Mahāyāna Buddhists would dispute the first three of these four features,
as Gier and Kjellberg (Buddhism), and Wallace (Buddhist), argue.
Kalupahana sees the key insight of the Buddha’s enlightenment
as this knowledge of dependent origination (30, 115): “Freedom from the
normal causal process and the attainment of the state in which the supernormal causal process is operative . . . is achieved as a result” (116). In
other words, Kalupahana thinks that conscious volition is sufficient for
moral responsibility, and that awareness of how causation operates
opens up the possibility of the Buddhist path to a kind of freedom from
the normal operation of causation. Although Kalupahana seems to implicitly accept soft determinism, because he is inconsistent about freedom
from causation, supernormal causal operations, psychic powers, and so
forth, he is difficult to pin down as a (soft) determinist. For instance,
echoing the other early-period scholars, Kalupahana states: “The principle of dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) avoids both strict determinism and chaotic indeterminism” (History 117). But this contradicts his
statements (2) and (3) above.
Consider his next remark: “Reflective awareness (anupassanā) in
the form of constant mindfulness (sati) is the means of discovering an
appropriate method of behavior in a world of bewildering variety, richness, and creativity” (117). Although it is not developed systematically,
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this remark implies that the increasingly-awakened mind has the ability
to act wisely, close to the compatibilist idea of acting “reasonresponsively.”30 He continues, “One who adopts such mindfulness is able
gradually to develop a method of behavior that need not necessarily conform to a preordained conception of ‘duty’” (History 117). Kalupahana is
highlighting flexibly responsive behavior (as opposed to rule worship),
the ability to spontaneously do the right thing regardless of situational
complexity. I think we could call this ability, cultivated through Buddhist
meditation disciplines, “Dharma-responsiveness,” as it parallels and yet
exceeds the above-mentioned notion of “reason-responsiveness.”
Kalupahana’s remarks about dependent origination as intermediate between determinism and indeterminism are enigmatic. His other
remarks only complicate matters. For instance, he says, “the principle of
dependent arising takes into account the natural happenings in the subjective as well as objective spheres . . . without admitting absolutely determined psychological or physical laws that are totally independent of
experience” (89). If there are no absolutely determined laws, however,
determinism is false. On the other hand, he says of the Buddha,
His doctrine had to steer clear of notions of permanent existence
and nihilistic non-existence, strict determinism and chaotic indeterminism . . . . The Buddha realized that it is inconsistent to advocate an absolute, inviolable law or uniformity and then take
refuge in its violations in order to account for the ‘unusual.’ Similarly, he was not willing to consider the mental life and freedom

30

See Fischer (My Way) for an account of reason-responsiveness as the key to a “semicompatibilist” form of free will that rejects the inflated, contracausal, indeterminismrequiring conception of autonomy as incompatible with determinism, but accepts a
deflated form of free will whereby the agent’s ability to respond appropriately to moral
reasons is compatible with determinism and sufficient for purposes of moral responsibility.
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as anomalies to be sacrificed on the altar of the nomological or
the neutral. (53)
Despite this suggestive language, Kalupahana does not unpack any account of how the intermediate position is supposed to work, except perhaps what is hinted at in his discussion of Ājīvika fatalism. There,
Kalupahana describes an interesting distinction between free will and
final freedom (liberation). The Ājīvikas rejected the efficacy of the will
but accepted the inevitability of liberation at the end of a necessitated
process. Kalupahana describes their fatalistic view by reference to a metaphor attributed to the Ājīvika teacher Makkhali Gosāla,31 as “compared
to a ball of thread thrown down from the summit of a mountain, which
will unwind to its full length” (Kalupahana History 15), presumably by
force of gravity alone. This image suggests inevitable movement in a certain direction. To this interesting metaphor Kalupahana adds, “No other
condition will make any difference to its length” (15).
The soft determinist would disagree about the irrelevance of effort as the string unwinds, claiming that some of the unwinding is the
result of efforts (even if some effort is the result of previous non-effortinvolving causes). The idea that specific causal conditions matter to the
chain of events distinguishes the determinist from the fatalist, who accepts only “fate” or “destiny” as an overarching cause, and the idea that
actions are initiating causes (even if they are themselves caused) distinguishes the soft from the hard determinist (and accounts for the fact
that soft determinists are evitablists, whereas hard determinists are inevitablists). It is surprising that Kalupahana does not argue that the efforts the practitioner makes are the conditions that account for the
particular movements of the unraveling ball of thread, even if those efforts are initiated by previous conditions (such as hearing the Dharma).

31

Dīgha Nikāya (DN) 1.20.
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The Buddha thought belief in fatalism threatened volitional impotence, i.e., paralysis of the will. For one who accepts what I have called
“volitional fatalism” above, once the unraveling string reached a knot, it
would stop unraveling, and ultimate liberation would be suspended indefinitely, at least until that knotted condition was removed. By contrast, Dharma-responsiveness prevents all sorts of knots. This sort of
adjustment to the Ājīvika’s string metaphor therefore aptly captures the
sense in which the Buddha would favor a non-fatalistic or “non-rigid”
determinism over a fatalistic or “rigid” form of determinism, although,
again, I prefer to avoid the confusing connotations of these descriptors
in favor of “hard” and “soft” determinism. Thus, regardless of whether
determinism and dependent origination are identical, it seems sufficiently clear that the Buddha would reject hard determinism. However,
two questions remain unresolved: whether dependent origination is best
described as non-rigid determinism and whether non-rigid determinism
equates with soft determinism.
Conclusion
I have reviewed the bulk of early-period scholarship on Buddhism and
free will and found it both intriguing and inconclusive, for although it
raises interesting questions, it gives us few clear answers. I have attempted to raise the level of discourse by laying bare those elements essential to properly understanding what is meant by “Buddhism and free
will” and by calling attention to important differences in explicit and
implicit doctrine. Our review has clarified certain points and has identified others that remain unresolved. The Buddha’s entire teaching rests
upon dependent origination. Dependent origination appears to be deterministic, but canonical counterexamples to determinism and physicalism suggest otherwise. It is possible that the Buddha may simply have
been a Barnhart-style “compatibilist” about these contradictory tensions: he may simply have blissfully maintained implicitly contradictory
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beliefs. (Of course, the belief that he attained a state of omniscience
counts strongly against this latter option.) Whereas hard and soft determinists agree with the karmavādins that actions have effects, hard determinism suggests that because there are no alternatives, actions are
inevitable. But belief in inevitability threatens volitional paralysis, and
because the Buddha thought a belief that threatens volitional paralysis
should be rejected, he would have rejected hard determinism. If dependent origination equates with determinism, it seems that the Buddha
would accept soft determinism.
The Buddha may have held that a kind of “virtually hard” but still
soft determinism applies more to worldlings than an unqualified soft determinism does, given the karmic heaviness of their volitional dispositions and their mental-bondage-fostering prizing of unregulated
volitional expression. That is, because the typical worldling is so mentally bound, it may be said that he is virtually unfree, and thus that the causation of his behavior ostensibly resembles that of the hard determined
(unless and until he begins to cultivate some volitional regulation and
some mental freedom). Because that possibility is always present for beings “blessed with human birth,” they are only virtually hard determined,
given the real possibility of reversing their conditions. By analogy, they
are akin to prisoners in a cell that is periodically (quietly) unlocked electronically, not knowing that the visibly closed but unlocked door contains the possibility of freedom. Thus, the Buddha may have held that
soft determinism applies more straightforwardly to serious or advanced
Buddhist practitioners, especially as their practice deepens, in light of
their intimate familiarity with the evitability principles of dependent
origination and thus their mental-freedom-fostering prizing of volitional
regulation—by analogy, their awareness of when and how the door is
locked and unlocked. In addition, he may have held that enlightened beings are not even properly described as soft determined because there is
no separation between them and deterministic reality; they are free be-
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cause no volitions or actions are truly attributable to them as separate
agents that could render them unfree.32 By analogy with the idea of virtual hard determinism, this might be described as a determinismconsistent “virtual indeterminist” position. Nonetheless, both qualifications—virtually hard and virtually indeterminist—remain qualifications
to, and thus forms of, soft determinism. Whether soft determinism is cogent is another matter, taken up elsewhere.33
The main unresolved doxographical issues are whether dependent origination should be characterized as soft determinism or as some
mysteriously hybrid non-rigid determinism, whether it applies to enlightened beings, and whether the no-self doctrine implies there is no
agency and thus no free will. If, in the final analysis, the Buddha was
simply a Barnhart-style compatibilist who held contradictory views,
these doxographical issues may remain unresolved. Even if we could resolve them, the alethic questions would remain long after we resolved
the doxographical ones. In the subsequent articles in this three-article
series, I trace the further evolution of these issues through the middleperiod scholarship, which leans heavily toward incompatibilism, and the
32

Lest I give the impression that I am claiming that enlightened beings lack volitions
(something I would deny), let me clarify the claims just made in the text. It is not that
an enlightened person is seen as without volitions, but rather that her volitions are not
the product of a separate ego. That is, an enlightened being has volitions but is free of
ego-volitions (volitions influenced by spiritual ignorance). Further, it is not obvious
that their volitions are just passively shaped by surrounding conditions, although Wallace seems to suggest as much when he describes enlightened behavior as exhibiting a
“kind of freedom” such that “one nonconceptually rests in this timeless, pristine
awareness, allowing actions to arise spontaneously and effortlessly, aroused by the interplay of one’s own wisdom and the needs of sentient beings from moment to moment.” (67-68). It seems perfectly consistent with the Buddha’s teachings that
enlightened beings may have non-egocentric volitions that are all Dharma-responsive,
such that they naturally respond only in wholesome ways to surrounding conditions,
rather than in ways that are influenced by ingrained delusion and self-centeredness.
Volitions connected with compassion, just to mention one type, appear to be both most
natural for enlightened beings and quite consistent with anātman or non-ego.
33

I argue that it is cogent (Meditation), but I also argue that the same model may be
held, with minor modifications, even if indeterminism is true (Counterfactual).
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recent-period scholarship, which (ironically) presents a forking path of
possibilities, one compatibilist and one incompatibilist, not unlike the
metaphorical forking path of possibilities that captures the impression
that free will is the power to determine which of two futures our choice
determines.
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